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THE “F” FACTOR: FINEMAN AS METHOD AND SUBSTANCE
Review of Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters,
Uncomfortable Conversations, edited by Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E.
Jackson, and Adam P. Romero (2009)
Nancy E. Dowd∗
Martha Fineman’s latest volume continues her long tradition of
challenging, unraveling, and moving forward the dialogue of equality and
justice.1 In this latest volume to emerge from the Feminism and Legal Theory
Project (FLTP), Fineman, together with her co-editors, Jack Jackson and Adam
Romero, has gathered an extraordinary group of scholars who explore the
intersections, differences, and synergies between feminist and queer legal
theory. Not only does this volume provide a comprehensive introduction and
sophisticated exposure to cutting-edge issues within and between these two
theoretical schools of thought, but it also exposes Fineman’s method of
“uncomfortable conversations” at its best. With her sustained support of
interdisciplinary work, her nurturing of scholars, and the platform she has
provided for intellectual and practical work through the FLTP, Fineman has
contributed enormously to critical theory, strategy, and action. Fineman,
however, has made more than this methodological contribution. Her critique
of foundational elements of law, including marriage, individualism,
dependency, and relationship, has had a profound substantive impact, as
∗ David H. Levin Chair in Family Law; Director, Center on Children and Families; University of Florida
Fredric G. Levin College of Law.
1 Martha Albertson Fineman has authored four volumes. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF
EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE VULNERABLE SUBJECT: ANCHORING EQUALITY IN THE HUMAN CONDITION
(forthcoming 2010). She has also edited and contributed to seven volumes in addition to the one reviewed in
this Essay. See AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha Albertson Fineman &
Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1990); FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS (ECONOMIC MAN) (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005); FEMINISM, MEDIA, AND THE LAW (Martha A. Fineman
& Martha T. McCluskey eds., 1997); MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINISM AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
MOTHERHOOD (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE
VIOLENCE (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994); TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2010); WHAT IS
RIGHT FOR CHILDREN? THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Karen Worthington eds., 2009).

DOWD GALLEYSFINAL

1192

8/18/2010 10:41 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

evidenced by the various interpretations of her work within this volume. This
too is the “F” factor, particularly for feminist legal theory but more broadly for
critical legal theory. In this review, I expose the particular impact of the “F”
factor by first describing the contributions of this volume and then exploring
the methodological and substantive aspects of the “F” factor.
I. FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY
This volume provides an unparalleled introduction to the connections and
differences between feminist and queer legal theory. Part I encompasses
foundational pieces that frame the dialogue, setting out core pieces and
positions, particularly queer theory’s challenge to feminist theory and the idea
of “taking a break” or theorizing without reference to feminism.2 It begins
with a piece by Janet/Ian Halley, which remains a focus of many of the
remaining chapters.3 Halley suggests that queer theorists “[t]ake a [b]reak
from [f]eminism.”4 While Halley does not advocate a complete separation of
the two fields, she does argue for the value of divergence over congruence on
the issue of sexuality.5 In particular, she sees queer theory’s position on
sexuality as sex-affirmative, or what she describes as “a rich brew of pro-gay,
sex liberationist, gay-male, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and sex-practicebased sex-radical, sex-positive, anti-male/female model, anti-cultural-feminist
political engagements, some more postmodernizing than others, some feminist,
others not.”6 She describes queer theory not only as sex-affirmative but also as
irrationalist (valuing contradiction, paradox, and crisis, affirming practices but
not identities, and politically engaging on the left) and then disavows her own
conclusion as doing exactly what queer theory is not, by naming what it is.7
Katherine Franke’s chapter reinforces the critique of feminists who focus
on danger and dependency without also considering desire and pleasure.8 As
2 Part One: Queer with or Without Feminist Legal Theory?, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY:
INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 7, 7–112 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds.,
2009) [hereinafter FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY].
3 Janet Halley, sub nom. Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY,
supra note 2, at 9–28.
4 Id. at 9.
5 Id. at 11.
6 Id. at 15.
7 Id. at 28 n.3 (“And indeed, that is how I saw it in 2004, when I wrote the article from which this
chapter is abstracted. I now regard this Conclusion to be a profound error in intellectual and political
strategy.”).
8 Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, in FEMINIST AND
QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 29–44.
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Franke asserts, feminists have worked to give women the right to say no, but
they have not focused on what it means to say yes. She is also critical of
feminists’ disproportionate scrutiny of mothers, which she labels as
“repronormative.”9 Martha Fineman might be read as both supporting and
departing from Franke. Fineman’s chapter summarizes her critique of the legal
focus on and support of the “sexual family”—adult relationships, particularly
marriage—instead of caretaking relationships, especially those of parents and
children.10 Without support for caretaking, patterns of care continue to be
replicated in inegalitarian ways.11 The sexual family as reproduced in law is
hardly one that either feminists or queer theorists would embrace, even if they
would reject it for different reasons, but Fineman argues that it is simply the
wrong place for social and legal support.
Vicki Schultz’s chapter argues for de-sexualization of the doctrine of
sexual harassment in the workplace, and instead focusing on how harassment
perpetuates sex segregation in jobs.12 Schultz sees harm in current sexual
harassment policies that clamp down or outlaw harmless sexuality in the
workplace, but also under-enforce or too narrowly conceptualize sexual
harassment with respect to gender policing of jobs.
Finally, Frank Valdes provides a comprehensive history of gay and lesbian
rights and the evolution of queer theory.13 Initially, queer theory scholarship
focused on exposing how heterosexism operates in law and culture.14 The
second stage, with the emergence of queer legal theory, began to imagine and
explore intersectionality and sexual orientation and moved from discrimination
against sexual minorities to subordination of multiple identity groups.15
Valdes is particularly concerned with the interrelationship between queer
theory and intersectionality, using as his example race and color. He exhorts
queer theory to be multiply inclusive and makes a passionate plea for

9

Id. at 30.
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Sexual Family, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2,
at 45–63.
11 Id. at 62.
12 Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace Revisited, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra
note 2, at 65–90.
13 Francisco Valdes, Queering Sexual Orientation: A Call for Theory as Praxis, in FEMINIST AND QUEER
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 91–112.
14 Id. at 91.
15 Id. at 92.
10
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multidimensional analysis.16 Valdes is the quintessential spokesperson for
making second-stage scholarship anti-essentialist.
With these foundational pieces in place, Part II of the volume is about
tensions, arguments, and hard conversations.17 Martha McCluskey explores
different takes on autonomy by feminists and queer theorists, as well as
significant differences in views on the role of the state and morality-based
positions.18 Tucker Culbertson and Jack Jackson critique the positions of
Halley and Schultz on feminism and argue in favor of collaboration rather than
separation.19 Mary Ann Case suggests that workplaces would benefit from a
reasonable “incest taboo in the workplace” that would operate socially, rather
than legally, to discourage or prevent relationships that limit equality of
opportunity.20 Her view would limit expression of sexuality and particular
relationships in the workplace.
Mary Becker critiques those who are critical of feminists’ emphasis on
care, arguing that if we are to help real women, we must be concerned about
care and how it shapes women’s lives.21 Finally, Adam Romero analyzes
Halley’s call to “take a break from feminism,”22 urging against this view.23
Romero claims Halley’s argument ignores the range of both feminist and queer
theory and explains that there is more to be gained by using both rather than
setting up an artificial opposition between the two.24 Romero’s piece reminds
us that these are diverse schools of thought, without fixed boundaries and with
the hallmarks of considerable internal diversity and disagreement.
Part III of the collection underscores the internal diversity of both feminism
and queer theory and the capacity of both for self-reflection and challenge
16

Id. at 93–94.
Part Two: Feminist with or Without Queer Legal Theory?, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY,
supra note 2, at 113–98.
18 Martha T. McCluskey, How Queer Theory Makes Neoliberalism Sexy, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 2, at 115–34.
19 Tucker Culbertson & Jack Jackson, Proper Objects, Different Subjects and Juridical Horizons in
Radical Legal Critique, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 135–52.
20 Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest Taboo in the Workplace, in FEMINIST
AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 153–58.
21 Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 159–77.
22 Janet Halley, sub nom. Ian Halley, supra note 3, at 9–28.
23 Adam P. Romero, Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer” Legal Theories, in
FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 179–98.
24 See id. at 197 (“Leaving discussion and debate over feminist and queer assumptions, conceptions, and
aspirations perpetually unlocked and unfinished, the focus on method makes for and produces a more dynamic,
mobile, transformative, responsive, informed, complex, and humble feminist and queer politics.”).
17
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from within.25 This Part also considers the diversity that Valdes calls for in his
chapter. It demonstrates how hierarchies and assumptions can be present even
in progressive critique and underscores the importance of having multiple
approaches to expose how subordination works. Kenji Yoshino discusses the
erasure of bisexuality and the tendency to reinscribe a gay/straight binary,
exploring why that tendency exists.26 Devon Carbado critiques the focus of
gay rights and civil rights and the implicit separation of race and sexual
orientation.27 He argues for an “anti-homophobic intervention into black civil
rights advocacy and an anti-racist intervention into gay rights advocacy.”28 He
emphasizes the importance of intersectionality, not only for legal strategy but
also in relation to the ways community is imagined. Paisley Currah exposes
how transgender identities reveal the importance of multiplicity, highlighting
the importance of supporting gender pluralism.29 Multiple definitions are
preferable as long as their existence results in more justice for transgendered
people.30 Finally, Elizabeth Emens explores polyandry—plural relationships
that are egalitarian rather than hierarchical—as opposed to monogamy and
questions what is served by the monogamy norm.31 All of these pieces are
critical of progressive norms in a way that challenges assumptions and expands
theory.
Part IV of the collection substantively focuses on family, relationships,
care, and marriage.32 It demonstrates the value of multiplicity and of the
disagreements that have emerged in conversations between and among
feminists and queer theorists. Carlos Ball wonderfully reframes the meaning
of autonomy and the rationale for same-sex marriage, weaving together threads
from feminist and queer theory.33 Ball’s shorthand for his approach is a sign
25

Part Three: Pluralizing Difference, in FEMINIST

AND

QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 199–

286.
26

Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY,
supra note 2, at 201–22.
27 Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY,
supra note 2, at 223–44.
28 Id. at 223.
29 Paisley Currah, The Transgender Rights Imaginary, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra
note 2, at 245–57.
30 Id. at 256–57.
31 Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, in FEMINIST AND QUEER
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 259–86.
32 Part Four: The Politics and Law of Kinship, Intimacy, and Care, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 2, at 287–372.
33 Carlos A. Ball, This Is Not Your Father’s Autonomy: Lesbian and Gay Rights from a Feminist and
Relational Perspective, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 289–312.
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from a San Francisco rally in support of same-sex marriage: “MARRIAGE =
FREEDOM.”34 He argues autonomy is the ability to make choices, and it
exists within relationships, not outside of them.35 Ball sees a connection
between Fineman’s support for true autonomy and the gay rights’ movement
toward the same goal, although he concedes that the two disagree about
marriage as the vehicle for autonomy.36 Ruthann Robson and Anna Marie
Smith, on the other hand, would both argue against the value of marriage—
Robson because the compulsion to marry offends freedom37 and Smith because
marriage is used as empty social policy against poor women.38 Smith would
further argue that gays and lesbians who support same-sex marriage should
refine their position to account for the state’s coercive use of marriage with
respect to poor mothers (the very state they call on for recognition uses that
form of recognition to oppress another group).39 Laura Kessler adds to the
conversation about care by articulating a position different from queer
theorists’ critique of care and feminists’ defense of the value of care.40 Using
examples of racial and ethnic minorities, gay and lesbian parents, and primary
caretaker fathers, Kessler argues that care has value as a transgressive,
liberating practice for caretakers. Her position implicates not only the
liberatory potential of care but also how care can expand the scope and
meaning of family, marriage, and caregiving relationships by transformation
from within.
The final Part of the collection considers practical implications of the
convergences and divergences of feminist and queer theories.41 Lara Karaian
considers the role of the gay, lesbian, and feminist communities in the struggle
over pornography and the use of anti-pornography rules to target gay and
lesbian sexualities.42 Similarly, Lynne Huffer reminds us that by focusing on
34

Id. at 290.
Id. at 311.
36 Id. at 308–09.
37 Ruthann Robson, Compulsory Matrimony, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at
313–28.
38 Anna Marie Smith, From Paternafare to Marriage Promotion: Sexual Regulation and Welfare
Reform, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 329–48.
39 Id. at 347.
40 Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at
349–72.
41 Part Five: Law and Strategy at the Crossroads of Feminist and Queer Legal Theories, in FEMINIST
AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 373–432.
42 Lara Karaian, The Troubled Relationship of Feminist and Queer Legal Theory to Strategic
Essentialism: Theory/Praxis, Queer Porn, and Canadian Anti-discrimination Law, in FEMINIST AND QUEER
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 375–94.
35
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the affirmative response to Lawrence, we have lost another part of the story
that relates to the unconstitutionality of sodomy statutes.43 In the same period
when Lawrence was litigated, a parallel case involving heterosexual sodomy
between an adult man and a teenage girl was appealed to the Georgia Supreme
Court.44 Huffer points out that, in the overall celebration of Lawrence as
liberatory, this story of subordination and victimization was lost and needs to
be remembered.45 Ann Scales reminds us that these imperfect practical results
are matched by the partiality of any attempt to pick the best approach or
achieve better justice and equality.46 She therefore rejects the notion that the
two theoretical camps are in opposition or that one must choose between them.
Rather, as Scales sees it, the more choices, the better; the more critiques, the
more those choices will be improved. Practitioners, Scales argues, regularly
use whatever best works in a particular situation and then modify the approach
as needed. On a practical level, they practice the contingent, multiple, neverfixed approach of both feminists and queer theorists because their aim is to
achieve the goals of more justice and more equality. In essence, she argues
against getting too caught up in disputes in the academy while there is work to
be done on the streets. She reminds us that, ultimately, how we think must
impact what we do. Kathryn Abrams’s postscript carries a similar message:
there are more synergies than differences, and the value is in the
conversations.47 Even more so, there are affirmative examples to be learned,
and Abrams points to cultivating ingrained, deep anti-essentialism while also
challenging categories in order to create coalitions. Discomfort or challenge
should bring epiphany, not dissolution.
At the end of this collection, it is clear how much the conversation suggests
growth and change. This is linked, I would argue, to the “F” factor, both in
method and substance. It is to these two observations that I now turn.

43

Lynne Huffer, Queer Victory, Feminist Defeat? Sodomy and Rape in Lawrence v. Texas, in FEMINIST
note 2, at 411–32.

AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra
44 Id.
45

Id. at 412–13.
Ann Scales, Poststructuralism on Trial, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at
395–410.
47 Kathryn Abrams, Postscript: Curious Encounters, Unpredictable Conversations, in FEMINIST AND
QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 433–38.
46
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II. THE “F”(INEMAN) FACTOR
The method that produced this volume is one Fineman employs as a core
piece of the FLTP: “uncomfortable conversations.” As Fineman states in her
introduction, “The purpose for holding Uncomfortable Conversations is to
bring together people with many common, but also some potentially
contentious and conflicting ideas. The Conversations provides a space where
these ideas can be discussed, debated, and perhaps even improved upon.”48
She also clearly sees the product of this method as a better way to challenge
inequality. She claims that “there is much to be gained from negotiating the
fault lines and building off the highly critical intellectual energies that the
queer-feminist tensions have produced.”49
There are several pieces, then, to this method. First is the embrace of
intellectual diversity even when it reflects profound disagreement. Second is
the insight that one can learn most from those with whom you most disagree.
Third is that disagreement is framed as constructive difference; that is, even
when there are strong differences and claims of inadequacy, insufficiency, or
error, the conversation is not personal. Often the conversation is political, as
differences in perspective translate into differences in strategy.
The
commonality in overall goals of commitment to equality and justice, however,
hold together the participants in the room. Fourth, this is a method that
operates from an understanding of acceptance and comfort in the intellectual
space even as it encourages strong critique and discomfort. Indeed, the
“uncomfortable” part of the conversation is that those who may seem like
natural allies may at the same time be each other’s strongest critics. The
discomfort arises not simply from difference, but also frequently from
disclosure of an unspoken point of view or lack of inclusion marking a flaw or
need for revision. The unease, then, often comes from embarrassment and
exposure of hidden perspectives directly in contradiction with the speaker’s
express desire for inclusiveness.
It is very challenging to create a space where this method can be
implemented. Fineman’s reputation for creating this space has drawn amazing
groups together under the aegis of the FLTP. She has been consciously
multidisciplinary and comparative, incorporating cross-cultural as well as
interdisciplinary perspectives. She has also included young scholars in the
48 Martha Albertson Fineman, Introduction: Feminist and Queer Legal Theory, in FEMINIST AND QUEER
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 1 n.1.
49 Id. at 6.
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conversation, encouraging them to be fearless and challenging and mentoring
them as they develop.
Uncomfortable conversations require a special kind of listening. Mari
Matsuda eloquently describes this hard listening as essential to coalition
The importance of understanding means that difficult
building.50
conversations should be understood not as breaking communication but rather
as encouraging it: “strong words are acts of engagement, not estrangement.”51
Listening to what may be perceived as angry or strong words, Matsuda argues,
is an opportunity for growth: “I could shelter myself from conflict by leaving
the conversation, but I have come to believe that the comfort we feel when we
avoid hard conversations is a dangerous comfort, one that seduces us into
ignorance about the experiences of others.”52
Accordingly, Fineman has contributed a powerful method to other feminist
methodologies that have transformed critical jurisprudence. Nancy Levit and
Robert Verchick describe feminist method as a means of exploring the real and
concrete, including,” (1) unmasking patriarchy, (2) contextual reasoning and
(3) consciousness raising.”53 Katharine Bartlett’s classic articulation of the
feminist method identified the core attributes as “asking the woman question,”
feminist practical reasoning, and consciousness raising.54
Uncomfortable conversations are critical to reminding feminists of the
unexamined perspective that presumes “woman” as a category that is race-less
and class-less, when in fact it can be raced and classed depending on the
approach. Angela Harris’s and Kimberle Crenshaw’s critiques of the
unexamined racial assumptions of feminists made anti-essentialism a core
method of feminist theory. This requires that the “woman question” include
asking whether all women are considered, whether all women are similarly
situated, and whether some women subordinate other women.55 Just as

50 Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 1183 (1991).
51 Id. at 1185.
52 Id. at 1185–86.
53 NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 45 (2006).
54 Katharine T. Bartlett, Cracking Foundations as Feminist Method, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y &
L. 31, 35 (2000); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 829 (1990).
55 See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139 (discussing the marginalization of black women in feminist theory and in antiracist politics);
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (discussing
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importantly, their exposure of the workings of intersectionality and multiple
core-identity characteristics make it critical that gender not be seen in isolation.
This is captured by Mari Matsuda’s method to “ask the other question.”56 That
is, it is precisely when we think an issue is about women, or about gender, that
we should ask what other markers of subordination may also be present.57
The classic critiques of critical race theorists remind feminists that
“woman” is not white. Others have noted the importance of thinking from an
express class perspective so that “woman” is not viewed as middle class.58
The insights of gay and lesbian theorists and queer theorists are part of this
tradition of reminding feminists that “woman” is not straight and further to
question “woman” as a stable category as well as the binary category of
gay/straight.59 All of these critiques reiterate that not all women are
subordinated and that women also may subordinate other women.60 The most
recent anti-essentialist reminder comes from masculinities theory, challenging
feminists to consider the gendered lives of boys and men as encompassing both
privilege and subordination.61 In addition to the woman question, the gender
that a woman’s experience can be isolated and described independent of race, class, sexual orientation, and
other realities of experience).
56 Matsuda, supra note 51, at 1189 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57 Id. (“The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination is through a method
I call ‘ask the other question.’ When I see something that looks racist, I ask, “Where is the patriarchy in this?”
When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, “Where is the heterosexism in this?” When I see something that
looks homophobic, I ask, “Where are the class interests in this?” Working in coalition forces us to look for
both the obvious and non-obvious relationships of domination, helping us to realize that no form of
subordination ever stands alone.”).
58 See, e.g., MARION CRAIN, Sex Discrimination as Collective Harm, in THE SEX OF CLASS: WOMEN
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LABOR 1 (Dorothy Sue Cobble ed., 2007); Marion Crain, Between Feminism and
Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903 (1994) (exploring the
interstices of feminism and unionism, where working class women struggle to survive). See generally Marion
Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819 (1992) (advancing an alternative vision of power
and its exercise by the experience of woman-centered labor unions).
59 See, e.g., RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992).
60 See supra notes 53–59.
61 NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE PRIVILEGE AND SUBORDINATION (forthcoming 2010);
see also Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 201, 201
(2008). For a sampling of work on masculinities, or focusing on men as subjects, see, for example, Frank
Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and
Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 853 (2006); Gail Dines, The White Man’s Burden: Gonzo
Pornography and the Construction of Black Masculinity, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 283, 285 (2006); Anna
Gavanas, Domesticating Masculinity and Masculinizing Domesticity in Contemporary U.S. Fatherhood
Politics, 11 SOC. POL. 247, 247 (2004); Olga Giller, Patriarchy on Lockdown: Deliberate Indifference and
Male Prison Rape, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 659, 660 (2004); Raymond Gunn, Inner-City “Schoolboy”
Life, 595 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 63, 63 (2004); Fadi Hanna, Punishing Masculinity in Gay
Asylum Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 913, 913 (2005); Joan W. Howarth, Executing White Masculinities: Learning
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question, and asking the other question,62 masculinities theory suggests that
feminists “ask the man question.” Asking the man question promises to
uncover a more complex portrait of gender privilege as well as expose male
hierarchies and male subordination.63 It also strongly underscores how gender
privilege can be completely undermined, particularly by race.64 That insight
from masculinities scholarship underscores the insight from critical race
theorists that patriarchy is racial and, thus, that race is a feminist issue.
In addition to her theoretical contribution, Fineman’s substantive work has
been influential across several domains of legal scholarship. It is no
exaggeration to say that no legal scholar of the family has gone untouched by
Fineman’s work.65 The richness of her work, and the many possible reads, are
from Karla Faye Tucker, 81 OR. L. REV. 183, 186 (2002); Kathleen Kennedy, Manhood and Subversion
During World War I: The Cases of Eugene Debs and Alexander Berkman, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1661, 1661 (2004);
Michael Kimmel, Integrating Men into the Curriculum, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 181, 181 (1997);
Sherene Razack, “Outwhiting the White Guys:” Men of Colour and Peacekeeping Violence, 71 UMKC L.
REV. 331, 331 (2002); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
187, 187; Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1037, 1038 (1996); Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term
Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 451 (1999); Christopher D. Man & John P.
Cronan, Forecasting Sexual Abuse in Prison: The Prison Subculture of Masculinity as a Backdrop for
“Deliberate Indifference,” 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 127, 130 (2001); Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the
Kulturkampt: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of American Masculinity, 12 L. & SEXUALITY
271, 273 (2003); Corey Rayburn, Why Are YOU Taking Gender and the Law?: Deconstructing the Norms That
Keep Men Out of the Law School’s “Pink Ghetto,” 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 71, 73–74 (2003); Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1271, 1272 (2004); James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The Supreme Court and
Sexual Terrorism in Prison, 81 N.C. L. REV. 433, 434 (2003); Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the
Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 1, 1–25, 35–41 (2005); Victor L. Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a
Masculine Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 433 (2002); Rachel L. Toker, Multiple Masculinities: A New
Vision for Same-Sex Harassment Law, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 577, 579–80 (1999); Francisco Valdes,
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual
Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1995); Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender
Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68, 74
(2002); Stephen H. Webb, Defending All-Male Education: A New Cultural Moment for a Renewed Debate, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 601, 601 (2001).
62 See supra note 57.
63 See Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 61.
64 See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of
Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309 (1997) (arguing that black women were important symbols because they
represented everything that “woman” was not, thereby defining womanhood); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993) (examining how whiteness, initially constructed as a form of racial
identity, evolved into a form of property and how it is protected in American law and continues in current
perceptions of racial identity).
65 For a very recent sampling, see, for example, Richard S. Collier, The Fathers’ Rights Movement, Law
Reform, and the New Politics of Fatherhood: Some Reflections on the UK Experience, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.

DOWD GALLEYSFINAL

1202

8/18/2010 10:41 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

apparent in this collection. Her critique of marriage is grounded in the
conviction that the parent–child bond, especially the mother–child relationship,
is far more important and worthy of state support than the heterosexual adult
bond—what she calls the sexual family—which is currently privileged through
marriage.66 Even if marriage were to encompass same-sex marriage, or if the
state were to support or impose responsibilities on cohabitants, Fineman would
still argue that this focus on adult sexual relationships is misplaced.67
Fineman’s articulation of dependency, through the twin concepts of
inevitable dependency and derivative dependency, exposes the fault lines of
family relationships that have such a profound impact on equality, family
structure, child welfare, and work/family balance. The need for state support is
greatest in the context of those in dependent relationships. She links the lack
of public policy to the mythology of autonomy, independence, and privacy that
blocks meaningful support for families.68 This profound fault line in public
policy impacts families, particularly those headed by women and those in
poverty, in serious ways.
Fineman’s influence on family law and feminist theory has been profound.
This collection adds to that influence, and it demonstrates the lasting
methodological and substantive impact of the “F” factor.
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